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Abstract
La Shonine Gandy-Smith
THE EFFECTS OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY ON JUROR VERDICT:
PSYCHIATRIST VERSUS PSYCHOLOGIST
2010/11
Professor Eleanor Gaer, PhD.
Master of Arts in Mental Health Counseling and Applied Psychology

The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of expert witness testimony on juror
verdicts. We, further, assessed whether there would be a difference in the relative influence of
MDs and PhD expert witnesses. Undergraduate and graduate students served as mock jurors and
were presented with an insanity case which either (a) a PhD testified for the defense and a MD
testified for the prosecution or (b) an MD testified for the defense and a PhD testified for the
prosecution. After analysis of verdicts, an “Insanity Defense Attitudes Survey,” and specific
witness credibility evaluations indicated no bias toward MD’s, except for the PhD-defense/MDprosecution condition. Implications for other case factors that combine to affect jurors’ verdicts
are discussed.
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Introduction
The history of expert witness testimony in criminal trials dates back to the
eighteenth century. Expert testimony is a staple in a wide variety of trials including, but
not limited to, business and toxic torts, contracts, intellectual property and anti-trust
cases. Although experts can testify in any case in which their expertise is relevant,
mental health professionals are more likely used in criminal cases. In times past, the
practice of the mental health professional as expert witness is one that had been
dominated by psychiatrists. This is due in part to the fact that the legal field has
historically favored medically trained persons1 as expert witnesses. Psychiatrists
subscribe to a medical model of mental illness, which explains mental disorder as being
physical diseases that are treatable by medications. This is different from the approach of
many other mental health professionals that subscribe to models that are more holistic.
Trial court judges have the authority to exercise their own discretion in
determining which members of the mental health profession might be admitted as expert
witnesses. Generally, case law supported the domination of “medical” experts in cases
involving complex psychological issues until the 1940 Michigan Supreme Court case of
People v. Hawthorne (Polythress, 1983). Even some areas of the field of psychology
itself presented some biases. A 1954 resolution adopted by the American Medical
Association, the Council of the American Psychiatric Association and the Executive
Council of the American Psychoanalytic asserted that “physicians” were the lone
legitimate experts in the field of mental illness or disease (Greenburg & Wursten, 1988).

1

“Medically trained” refers to a person who has received a degree in medicine (M.D.) from medical
school.
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Polythress (1983) chronicles the early shift from the medical psychological
witness as the preferred witness. He cites People v. Hawthorne (1940), which set in
motion a push back against the restriction of nonmedical testimony regarding
psychological issues. Judge Butzel issued this opinion in the case: “There is no magic in
particular titles or degrees.” Jenkins v. United States (1962) ruled that a lack of a medical
degree would not automatically bar a psychologist from testifying on the mental state of
an individual. It, also, reaffirmed the importance of “demonstrable training and practical
experience in the areas of diagnosing and treating psychopathology over simple
possession of certain titles or degrees (p.3).”
Case specificity of expert witness testimony can be conceptualized as a
continuum ranging from purely educative to conclusively evaluative. Mental health
professionals are often called upon to testify in legal proceedings as “fact” witnesses or as
“expert” witnesses. As fact witnesses, they are treated as other witnesses and may be
asked to provide information from their practice (e.g. what treatment they gave, who said
what). On the other hand, an expert witness is an individual with special knowledge
likely to be helpful in court. They may testify to matters of their special learning or
knowledge. In recent years, psychologists have contributed theoretical and empirical
evidence to address seemingly common sense understanding of legal procedures. For
example, the fact that eyewitnesses could be wrong or that traumatic memories may be
fabricated is a factor that the average juror may not apply to the processing of evidence
they receive during a trial. Yet, psychological research has established both the
theoretical and empirical foundations for these assertions. In addition, the expert witness
may, also, testify to matters of opinion. The expert witness is expected to yield testimony
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that will shed light on a subject matter that is outside common experience or scope of
knowledge of the average juror. It is to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue (Fed. R. Evid. 702, 1975).”
Jurors are frequently reluctant to render guilty verdicts in the absence of hard
facts. For example, prosecutors have had a difficult time obtaining convictions in rape
cases, despite bringing their strongest cases. The issue in rape cases often becomes one
of his words against hers. The average person, like the average juror, may have
numerous myths, stereotypes and misconceptions about the phenomenon of rape that may
adversely affect the perceptions of the victim‟s credibility in court. Although research
indicates that in about 40% of all rapes, the victim is at least casually acquainted with her
assailant, it is commonly believed that “true” rape involves strangers (Brekke & Borgida,
1988). Expert witness testimony about this research may greatly affect the juror‟s
perception of the case.
In a study conducted by Loftus (1980), the influence of expert witness testimony
about eyewitness identification on jury verdicts in both violent and nonviolent cases were
assessed. Half of the jurors read about the testimony of a defense expert on the reliability
of eyewitness identification, and half did not. The results indicated there was an increase
in the amount of attention that jurors gave to eyewitness accounts when psychological
expert testimony was present.
Blackman and Brickman (1984) explored the various aspects of the use and
impact of expert testimony in cases of battered women who kill. When an expert witness
testifies during the trial of a battered woman who has killed her husband, she or he is
regularly engaged in a process of re-education. Experts who testify about battered
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women‟s experiences are addressing jurors who possess ideas and experiences about
conflict within family relationships and traditional sex roles in family life. These
commonly held beliefs, however, may not necessarily be accurate and often reflect myths
and stereotypes about battered women. Expert testimony by social psychologists attempt
to refine and advance current beliefs.
The complexity of legal litigation can present conflict for juror decision making
capabilities. Juries face a difficult and complex task of comprehending the evidence
presented. Trial complexity has even led some legal scholars and judges to question
whether there are cases so complex that juries cannot render verdicts fairly based upon a
rational evaluation of the evidence. (Cooper, Bennet & Sukel, 1996).
There is cause for concern about the comprehension of the average juror for two
reasons. First, jurors may be overwhelmed by the volume of evidence that is presented
during a trial. Additionally, there are judicial instructions given in a case. There may
also be several expert witnesses for one case. Second, the average juror is not adept in
understanding legal concepts. Most jurors do not follow instructions on the law given by
the judge in a case. The information is often presented using legal terms and jargon.
Most jurors cannot remember the information given, much less interpret.
Scientific evidence in cases is, also, often presented in technically complex
language. Cooper, Bennet & Sukel (1996) demonstrate when scientific evidence is
presented in technically complex language, simulated jurors are more persuaded by a
witness with more impressive credentials. Research seems to indicate that jurors look to
other factors of the expert to determine whether they feel what he or she has to say is
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credible; and, therefore what they say should be applied to the juror‟s comprehension of
the case.
Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois and ForsterLee (2001) conducted a study
where one hundred twenty mock jurors heard one of several versions of a civil trial on
audiotape. The tort trial was either high or low in information load and contained
evidence that either clearly favored the plaintiffs or was ambiguous. The expert witness
was a medical doctor and testified in either technical or less technical language. Results
show high information loads and technical language hindered evidence processing. The
verdicts favored plaintiffs when the evidence was clear and presented in technical
language because technical language enhanced witnesses‟ credibility when the evidence
was clear. This finding would suggest that there are certain characteristics of the expert
witness and not the testimony alone that affects the juror decision-making.
Perlin (1977) asserts although clinical psychologists may be gaining equality with
psychiatrists as expert witnesses, it is only in terms of “legal status” and that psychiatrists
may continue to have a higher “social status” in the courtroom. The perception of judges
may have changed enough to allow technical admissibility of a nonmedical expert
witness to take the stand, but if the bias is also, social, the effect on jurors must also be
considered. According to Berlo, Lemmert & Mertz (1970), credibility is enhanced when
the communicator holds a position of high status.
Two studies have actually compared psychologists and psychiatrists in a legal
context. They report paradoxical findings. Polythress (1983) found that among trial
judges, there was still a medical bias in attitudes. In the study, trial judges were surveyed
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony of members of several professional
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groups on a wide range of issues that arise in criminal justice proceedings. The results
revealed there was some evidence of preference for testimony by medical experts.
Psychiatrists received the highest ratings on six of eight legal issues. Conversely,
Swenson, Nash and Roos (1984), in a simulated child-custody case, found that
psychologists and social workers were perceived as more credible than psychiatrists. The
latter result may have occurred because the area of dispute is one in which psychologists
and social workers have historically established expertise.
A large body of research in social cognition indicates that attitudes can strongly
bias the information processing sequence. Jurors‟ attitudes have strong influences on
their decision-making and case judgments. Juror attitudes can even affect cognitive
function ranging from attention to memory (Louden & Skeem, 2007). Juror attitudes
often override the application of legal standards in cases. In insanity defense cases, for
example, jurors are tasked with applying the appropriate legal standard of insanity to the
evidence presented at trial to reach a verdict. Insanity defense cases are perfect examples
of instances where many jurors often ignore legal instructions and personal convictions
and/or preference may have some bearing on their verdicts. Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw and
Koch (1985) tested real jurors and found that their attitudes toward the insanity defense
predicted verdicts. Specifically, negative attitudes towards the insanity defense strongly
predicted verdicts of “guilty.” Finkel et. al found these findings to be consistent with the
“vast amount” of research that has established, attitudes toward the insanity defense exert
considerable influence on mock jurors‟ verdicts in insanity cases.
The issue of criminal insanity is one of the best examples of the differing
approaches of psychology and law and the tension that exists as a result. When a
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defendant asserts the affirmative defense of insanity they are examined by a mental
health psychiatrist or psychologist. The first step for any psychiatrist/psychologist is to
diagnose the defendant with some form of mental disorder. Once that step is completed,
the psychiatrist/psychologist must determine how severe the defendant‟s functional
impairment is (or the severity of the mental disorder). The psychiatrist must then make
inferences as to whether the defendant has the capacity for judgment. In essence, the
legal system uses the mental health system to answer the question of whether an
individual is sane or not (insanity). This question, however, is not easily answered
because the law and psychology define insanity differently.
In order for a person to be convicted of a crime, it must be proven that, along with
the conscious act, there was intent or mens rea. The defense of insanity is often used by
an individual accused of a crime to negate mens rea. There are currently two major legal
standards of insanity used in the United States. The most notable is the McNaughton
rule, which excuses criminal conduct if the defendant 1) did not know what he or she was
doing or 2) did not know what he or she was doing was wrong. One of the major
criticisms of the McNaughten rule is that, in its focus on the cognitive ability to know
right from wrong, it fails to take into consideration the issue of control or "irresistible
impulse". Psychiatrists agree that it is possible to understand that one's behavior is
wrong, but still be unable to stop oneself.
Approximately half of the states in the United States currently use the Brawner
rule as the legal standard of insanity. The Brawner rule states that the defendant is not
responsible for his or her criminal behavior if he or she lacks substantial capacity to
either appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his
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or her conduct to the requirements of law (Butler, 2006). The law is interested in whether
the defendant knew right from wrong at the moment of the alleged wrongdoing. Even if
a person is diagnosed with a specific mental disorder, the defense would have to prove
that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness at the time of
the criminal act, in order to please Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI). NGRI is
also referred to as the insanity defense.
Are people who suffer from mental illness capable of appreciating the difference
between right and wrong? The case of Andrea Yates, a Texas mother known for killing
her five young children on June 20, 2001 is a recent case that explores this question. It
was reported that she suffered for years with postpartum depression and psychosis. The
McNaughten Rule was used in her case and she was initially convicted of capital murder.
Her conviction was later overturned on appeal and a jury ruled Yates was Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity (Resnick, 2007).
Andrea Yates had called the police after she killed her children and admitted that
she had done something wrong. This matters a lot to legal conceptions of insanity, and
may have influenced the initial verdict, but it matters little to psychology. Psychology
views psychotic behaviors as outward manifestations of a disease process that impairs
rational thinking. In other words, mental illness is not something that can be turned on
and off. It erodes the normal operations of the brain. So, it is conceivable that an
individual would exhibit both rational and irrational behaviors fluidly. It is, furthermore,
conceivable that a person with a mental disease can exhibit rational behaviors and not be
an individual with the capacity to appreciate wrongfulness.
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The insanity defense issue is one that is complex and there is conflict between the
professionals. With such tension between the professionals, one could imagine the
confusion that such technical language and complex ideas cause jurors. This may be the
reason that many jurors rely on their own knowledge and convictions and ignore legal
standards.
Poulson, Wuensch, Brown and Braithwaite (1997) cite a number of researchers
that have identified the important role of expert testimony in juror‟s decision making. In
their research, they cite James (1960) who conducted a study of juror evaluation of expert
psychiatric testimony using mock jurors. The study revealed that 74% of mock jurors
believed psychiatric testimony was helpful in choosing a verdict. In a study conducted
by Greenberg and Wursten (1988), the relative perceptions and influences of MD and
PhD expert witnesses were assessed. Eighty-four Introductory Psychology students
attended experimental sessions in groups of 5-25. They read a case, were asked to
provide verdicts and answer questions on how they made their decisions. In the first
condition, subjects were exposed to PhD‟s testimony for the defense and MD‟s testimony
for the prosecution. In the second condition, subjects were exposed to MD‟s testimony
for the defense and the PhD‟s for the prosecution. The credentials for both the PhD and
MD were approximately equal. With the exception of specific training differences, their
testimonies were identical. They found bias in favor of MDs in that subjects tended to
follow the MD‟s recommendations, endorse attitudes consistent with the MD‟s testimony
and rate the MD as more credible. This was primarily true in the condition where the
PhD testified for the defense and the MD testified for the prosecution. This finding was
most evident among weakly involved subjects.
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There were two purposes for conducting the current study. First, I
replicated the previous research by examining whether expert witness testimony has an
effect on juror verdict and, further, whether there is a difference between psychologist
and psychiatrist as expert witnesses in terms of credibility. Second, I extended previous
research through the utilization of a sample that will, presumptively, be less weakly
involved than the subjects involved in the previous research due to their years of
education and age. The current study will use graduates students, as well as,
undergraduate students. The assumption is that with the presumptively stronger graduate
student sample, the MD testimony will have a greater effect across conditions.

Method
Subjects
Ninety-four students from Rowan University, 81 undergraduate students and 13
students, volunteered to participate in this study. The average participant was 21.5.

Design
A 2x2 factorial design was used; participants were assigned randomly to
conditions with the restriction that an equal number of participants participate in each
condition. Half of the participants read a summary of one crime and court proceedings
and the other half read a separate crime. Within each of these conditions half of the
participants read a version of the of the case where they were exposed to the PhD‟s
testimony for the defense and the MD‟s testimony for the prosecution and half were
exposed to the MD‟s testimony for the defense and the PhD‟s for the prosecution.
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Procedure
Participants were told that they would be participating as jurors in a jury study
and were admonished to remember that juror decisions are extremely important and
would affect the life of the accused if they were actually in a courtroom. They were
informed that they would be asked to read a case, complete a verdict slip (which also
includes questions on how they made their decisions), and complete an Insanity Defense
Attitude Survey.
Participants were asked to read the case summary, which included testimony from
experts from both prosecution and defense. In first condition, participants read Case A
and were exposed to the PhD‟s testimony for the defense and the MD‟s testimony for the
prosecution. In the second condition, participants read Case A and were exposed to the
MD‟s testimony or the defense and the PhD‟s testimony for the prosecution. In the third
condition, participants read Case B and were exposed to the PhD‟s testimony for the
defense and the MD‟s testimony for the prosecution. In the fourth condition, participants
read Case B and were exposed to the MD‟s testimony or the defense and the PhD‟s
testimony for the prosecution. We took care to ensure that the credentials for each were
approximately equal; specifically, both experts practiced for 15 years, both had published
extensively, and both had graduated from Ivy League universities. Except when the
specific training differences were highlighted for PhD‟s and MD‟s, the testimonies were
identical. At the end of each case, participants were given legal definition of insanity,
along with, a lay definition of insanity.
Participants completed a Verdict Slip (e.g, “Do you find that the Defendant,
James Edward, is NOT GUILTY of the charge of criminal homicide?” “Do you find that
Defendant, James Edward is GUILTY of the charge of criminal homicide?” “Do you find
11

that the Defendant, James Edward, is not guilty because he was legally insane at the time
he shot and killed David Schultz or NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY?”)
and responded to the Insanity Defense Attitude Survey (e.g., “The insanity defense is
never an appropriate defense for the crime of first-degree murder,” “I am opposed to the
insanity defense, but I would consider it under certain circumstances,” “In principle, I
favor the insanity defense, but I would not consider it under certain circumstances,” “The
insanity defense is always an appropriate defense for the crime of first-degree murder”).
Case A
James Edward operated a wrestling training facility on the estate. He, also,
provided housing on the estate to some of the wrestlers who trained at the
facility. Over the years, James Edward developed close relationships with some
of the wrestlers at his facility. He, on the other hand, came to dislike others. In
1995, he began to show signs of dislike toward David Schultz, a successful
wrestler and also one of the facility‟s wrestling coaches. On the afternoon of
January 16, 1996, James Edward drove to the home of Mr. Schultz accompanied
by one of the estate security consultants. Mr. Schultz was working on his car in
his driveway when they arrived, but greeted James Edward. James Edward stuck
his hand out the window, pointed a gun at Mr. Schultz and asked, “You got a
problem with me?” He, then, shot him three times with a .44 Magnum revolver.
He, then, pointed the weapon at the security consultant and toward Shultz‟s wife
who was standing in the doorway of the residence.
Soon after, James Edward fled in his vehicle to his mansion, reloaded and locked
up his weapon. When the police arrived, he refused to surrender to the police.
At trial, James Edward did not dispute that he shot Mr. Schultz, but he puts forth
a defense of insanity. Defense witness and girlfriend of James Edward, Nancy
White, testified about James Edwards‟ bizarre and delusional behavior in recent
years. She also claimed that Edward thought Schultz was part of a conspiracy
against him.
The defense presented Dr. Chris Hatcher, a psychologist in private practice. Dr.
Hatcher had an opportunity to assess James Edward and gave him a diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia. Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security
consultant of Edward‟s, painted a portrait of James Edward as a rich and arrogant
man who had grown increasingly angry with Schultz during the year before the
shooting. The prosecution contended that James Edward‟s actions after the
shooting --retreating to his mansion and holding police sharpshooters at bay for
12

two days, refusing to surrender and asking for his lawyer more than 100 times
during that time -- proved James Edward understood it was wrong to shoot
Schultz (Appellee v. John DuPont, 1999).

Case B
George Thaw was the son of a software multimillionaire. In January 1994, he
began dating former model and actress, Mary Claire. After only one year of
dating, Thaw and Mary Claire married in a private ceremony in Los Angeles,
CA. During the time of their short courtship, Mary Claire revealed to Thaw that
she was seduced by noted architect, Stephen White in 1991 when she was only
sixteen years old, which made this act statutory rape. White was forty-seven
years old and married. After their marriage, Thaw went into rages regarding
White. The Thaw and White travelled in the same social circles and have many
common associates.
Thaw was paranoid about the fact that White was still interested in pursuing a
relationship with his wife. Mary Claire would insist to Thaw that things were
over and she had not even spoken with White in years. Thaw became obsessed
with White and hired detectives to follow him. He made his wife refer to White
only as “the Beast.” On the evening of June 25, 1996, George Thaw shot and
killed noted architect Stephen White during the performance of a Broadway
musical at New York‟s Madison Square Garden. White was unarmed and
defenseless.
At trial, defense witness and wife of George Thaw, Mary Claire, testified about
Thaw‟s bizarre and delusional behavior in recent years. The defense presented
Dr. Alexander Smith, a psychologist in private practice. Dr. Smith said that he
interviewed Thaw and observed a nervous agitation and restlessness. From the
evidence he diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic.
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Thaw of the
painted a portrait of George Thaw as a rich and arrogant man who had grown
increasingly angry with White during the year before the shooting. The
prosecution presented Dr. John Davis, a clinical associate professor of psychiatry
at Johns Hopkins University where he also received his MD. Dr. Davis testified
that he had an opportunity to assess George Thaw and gave him a diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Davis also testified that it was his expert opinion
that Thaw was fully aware of his actions at the time he shot White (Pinta, 2007).

(See Appendices A & B for full cases).
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Results
The possible range on the Verdict Slip questions for all of the questions except,
“Which expert did you find most credible?” was 0-10, where high scores indicated higher
levels of agreement with the particular question. The mean scores on the Verdict Slip
questions for the four conditions can be found in Table 1.1.
Analysis of the question, “Which expert witness do you find most credible?”
found preliminary analysis comparing the number of participants that answered either
PhD (M=41) or MD (M=53) for the question, “Which expert witness did you find most
credible?” participants-jurors indicated no significant difference.
There was a correlation, r(92) = .298, p < .01, between participants who found the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and those who reported their verdict was
affected by expert witness testimony.

Conversely correlations show, if a participant

found the defendant guilty, they were less likely to do so because of the expert witness
testimony, r(92) = -.185, p < .01. This was a negative correlation.
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Table 1.1 Verdict Slip Means
Edward Case

Thaw Case

PhDDefense/MDProsecution

MDDefense/PhDProsecution

PhDDefense/MDProsecution

MDDefense/PhDProsecution

Do you find that the Defendant,
X, shot and killed X?

10*

9.38

8.76*

9.73

Do you find that the Defendant,
X, is not guilty because he was
legally insane at the time he shot
and killed X?

3.20

3.80

2.76

3.21

Do you find that the Defendant,
X, is guilty of the charge of
criminal homicide?

8.28

8.04

8.04

8.61

Did expert witness testimony
affect your verdict of guilty or
innocent for the defendant?

6.64

5.81

5.76

6.65

* significant differences

Results showed significant differences between groups on conditions where the
PhD was the expert witness for the defense and the MD was expert witness for the
prosecution (M=9.129, F(3,90) = 8.084, p < .001 ). There was one significant difference
between the PhD-defense/MD-prosecution conditions on the question, “Do you find that
the Defendant, X, shot and killed X?” F(3,90)=2.954, p=.037. This was for both the
Edward (M=10) Thaw and (M=8.76) cases.

There was, also, between subjects

differences for the overall total of scores for grade levels, freshman (M=8.6, SD=.36) and
graduate (M=9.7, SD=.40) (M=9.129, F(4) = 4.386, p = .003) on verdict slip question,
“Do you find that the defendant, X, shot and killed David Schultz?
Results of the “Insanity Defense Attitude Survey” showed no extremes. Only 1
participant felt the insanity defense was “always” an appropriate defense for criminal
15

homicide. In addition, only 2 participants felt the insanity defense was “never” an
appropriate defense for criminal homicide. More than half of the participants were
opposed the insanity defense, but would consider it under certain circumstances, n=67.
The remainder of the participants favored the insanity defense in principle, but would not
consider it under certain circumstances n=24. This survey was primarily included to find
whether or not mock jurors‟ attitudes toward the insanity defense would affect selection
of a guilty verdict. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between those
who felt the insanity defense was never appropriate (M=5.00, SD=5.66) and those who
were opposed to the insanity defense, but would consider it (M=8.49, SD=2.19).

Discussion
We found there was no overall bias in favor of MD‟s. In fact, MD‟s and PhD‟s
were favored almost equally. There was, however, a medical bias evident under specific
conditions. A medical bias was found on credibility measures in the PhD-defense/MDprosecution case. In this condition, the MD was consistently viewed as more expert. In
the MD-defense condition, however, subjects found the witnesses equally trustworthy. It
is unclear as to why the MD‟s were only seen as more credible in the PhD-defense/MDprosecution condition. It would seem that a medical bias should have been evident
despite the condition. Greenberg and Wursten (1988) suggest that when testifying for the
state, the witness is viewed as more authoritative.
There was significance in participants‟ beliefs that expert witness testimony
affected their verdicts. This finding implies the importance and relevance of expert
16

witness testimony in legal proceedings. Interestingly, expert witness testimony had the
most effect when participants delivered NGRI verdicts. This seems to suggest that the
mental health profession has credibility when it comes to assisting the general public in
understanding mental illness.
The absence of a medical bias may be a reflection of the generations. The mental
health field covers a wide range of professions. Weakening of medical biases may be due
to generational perceptions of the mental health profession. This absence may, also, be
due to the field of mental health, generally, moving toward a wellness model rather than a
medical model.
Results of the “Insanity Defense Attitudes Survey” showed no extreme attitudes
about the insanity defense. It was expected that this issue would be polarizing and that
people would have very strong attitudes. The opposite proved true. It proved to be an
issue that participants had mixed attitudes about. This, however, was beneficial for this
particular study because we were able to factor out extreme attitudes about the insanity
defense as having a major effect on juror verdicts.
There are limitations to this study. Insanity cases were chosen due to the idea that
these types of cases are not as easy to decipher without specific mental health expert
information. Perhaps, other case types may have presented varied results. Another
limitation is the fact that the mental health profession is broadening. The type of expert
witness that may be called from the mental health profession may not be exclusive to
psychiatrists and psychologists. Further study could explore the perceptions and
influence of other mental health professionals. Some areas of the mental health
profession are rather new, like the field of counseling. The legal and the mental health
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professions must be prepared to demonstrate their competence, expertise and credibility
of these professionals.
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Appendix A
Edward Case
THE CRIME
James Edward resided on an 800-acre estate known as “Foxcatcher Farm.” For many
years James Edward operated a wrestling training facility on the estate. He, also,
provided housing on the estate to some of the wrestlers who trained at the facility and
were members of “Team Foxcatcher,” which was the name of a wrestling team founded
by James Edward.
Over the years, James Edward developed close relationships with some of the wrestlers at
his facility. He, on the other hand, came to dislike others. In 1995, he began to show
signs of dislike toward David Schultz, a successful wrestler and also one of the facility‟s
wrestling coaches. On the afternoon of January 16, 1996, James Edward drove to the
home of Mr. Schultz accompanied by one of the estate security consultants. Mr. Schultz
was working on his car in his driveway when they arrived, but greeted James Edward.
James Edward stuck his hand out the window, pointed a gun at Mr. Schultz and asked,
“You got a problem with me?” He, then, shot him three times with a .44 Magnum
revolver. He, then, pointed the weapon at the security consultant and toward Shultz‟s
wife who was standing in the doorway of the residence.
Soon after, James Edward fled in his vehicle to his mansion, reloaded and locked up his
weapon. When the police arrived, he refused to surrender to the police. During the two
day standoff which followed, James Edward spoke with his attorney on numerous
occasions. He was finally apprehended on January 18, 1996 when he left the mansion to
attempt a repair of the heating system.
People who knew James Edward noticed a change in his behavior and emotional state
around the time of his mother‟s death in 1988. James Edward became extremely security
conscious and hired a security firm in 1993 to provide protection on the estate. Despite
the firm‟s efforts implementing extensive security measures, James Edward exhibited
paranoid fear on several occasions that he was being spied upon and that his life was in
danger. Several witnesses also related incidents of James Edward‟s drug and alcohol
abuse between 1988 and 1995. In spite of his unusual behavior, however, James Edward
continued to manage his facility and maintain daily operations.
THE TRIAL
James Edward did not dispute that he shot Mr. Schultz, but he puts forth a defense of
insanity.
Defense
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Defense witness and girlfriend of James Edward, Nancy White, testified about James
Edwards‟ bizarre and delusional behavior in recent years. Nancy said that the millionaire
had razor wire installed in the walls and attic of his house to keep intruders out,
complained about mechanical trees moving on his property and often referred to himself
by such titles as the Dalai Lama and Christ child. She also claimed that Edward thought
Schultz was part of a conspiracy against him.
The defense presented Dr. Chris Hatcher, a psychologist in private practice. Dr. Hatcher
is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame who also received a PhD from Harvard
University. He has been a practicing psychologist for 15 years.
Dr. Hatcher had an opportunity to assess James Edward and gave him a diagnosis of
paranoid schizophrenia. This evidenced by his delusional beliefs, particularly during the
standoff and in examinations after the shooting, that he was Jesus Christ, the Dalai Lama,
and a Russian czar, among others.

Prosecution
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Edward‟s, painted a
portrait of James Edward as a rich and arrogant man who had grown increasingly angry
with Schultz during the year before the shooting.
The prosecution contended that James Edward‟s actions after the shooting --retreating to
his mansion and holding police sharpshooters at bay for two days, refusing to surrender
and asking for his lawyer more than 100 times during that time -- proved James Edward
understood it was wrong to shoot Schultz.
On rebuttal, Dr. Lunde testified that he had an opportunity to assess James Edward and
gave him a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Lunde also testified that it was his
expert opinion that Mr. Edward was fully aware of his actions at the time he shot Mr.
Schultz.
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Appendix B
Thaw Case
THE CRIME
George Thaw was the son of a software multimillionaire. In January 1994, he began
dating former model and actress, Mary Claire. After only one year of dating, Thaw and
Mary Claire married in a private ceremony in Los Angeles, CA.
During the time of their short courtship, Mary Claire revealed to Thaw that she was
seduced by noted architect, Stephen White in 1991 when she was only sixteen years old,
which made this act statutory rape. White was forty-seven years old and married. After
their marriage, Thaw went into rages regarding White. The Thaw and White travelled in
the same social circles and have many common associates.
Thaw was paranoid about the fact that White was still interested in pursuing a
relationship with his wife. Mary Claire would insist to Thaw that things were over and
she had not even spoken with White in years. Thaw became obsessed with White and
hired detectives to follow him. He made his wife refer to White only as “the Beast.”
On the evening of June 25, 1996, George Thaw shot and killed noted architect Stephen
White during the performance of a Broadway musical at New York‟s Madison Square
Garden. White was unarmed and defenseless.

THE TRIAL
Defense
Defense witness and wife of George Thaw, Mary Claire, testified about Thaw‟s bizarre
and delusional behavior in recent years. Nancy said that the millionaire had consistently
accused her of having secret relationship with White, despite the fact that she insisted that
she would never have had a relationship with the man that took such advantage of her as
a young woman. Mary Claire testified to the fact that Thaw hired detectives to hire her,
as well as, White. She also claimed that Thaw thought she and White were conspiring
against him in order to get his fortune.
The defense presented Dr. Alexander Smith, a psychologist in private practice. Dr. Smith
is a graduate of the University of Notre Dame who also received a PhD from Harvard
University. He has been a practicing psychologist for 15 years and has published
extensively.
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Dr. Smith said that she interviewed Thaw and observed a nervous agitation and
restlessness. From the evidence she diagnosed the defendant as schizophrenic, chronic
undifferentiated type, characterized by abnormal thoughts, difficulty with emotional
control, deficiency in common sense judgment, and lacking in close relationships with
other people.
Prosecution
Prosecution witness, Theodore Brown, former security consultant of Thaw of the painted
a portrait of George Thaw as a rich and arrogant man who had grown increasingly angry
with White during the year before the shooting.
The prosecution contended that George Thaw‟s actions after the shooting –fleeing to his
home on the island of Barbados, making several calls to his lawyer and refusing to
surrender before being caught by the police and extradited to the United States -- proved
Thaw understood it was wrong to shoot White.
The prosecution presented Dr. John Davis, a clinical associate professor of psychiatry at
Johns Hopkins University where he also received his MD. Dr. Lunde is a graduate of the
University of Notre Dame. He has been a practicing psychiatry for 15 years and has
published extensively.
On rebuttal, Dr. Davis testified that he had an opportunity to assess George Thaw and
gave him a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Davis also testified that it was his
expert opinion that Thaw was fully aware of his actions at the time he shot White.
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